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ABSTRACT
One of the issues in dependable complex systems execu-
tion process is the presence of a high dimension of decisions
to be taken into account when deciding the next action to be
taken. While in designing the logical architecture of a sys-
tem, various dependability aspects such as safety, reliability,
and security must be considered. Moreover, in case of high-
assurance systems, it is required to analyze these aspects
with rigorous methods. In this paper, we present an open-
source tool called CHESS, a cross-domain model-based engi-
neering environment, along with various analysis support
for dependable complex systems. CHESS enforces the decou-
pling of different functional parts of the system as compo-
nents that can bemodeled, analyzed, verified, stored, reused
individually, and later be integrated to meet the system’s
common goal. Extended from UML/SysML and MARTE, the
CHESSMLmodeling language supports themodeling of real-
time dependable systems including safety and security as-
pects. In CHESS the user can perform different model-based
analyses to ensure system dependability at various stages of
the development. As a result, we present the newly released
CHESS features and we will show how CHESS contributed
to several research projects.
1 INTRODUCTION
Effective design methods are essential for the development of
dependable systems. The ever increasing complexity of systems in
various domains such as transportation, space, energy, health, and
industrial production requires effective design and development
methods. The heterogeneity of components requires modeling ap-
proaches that span the different technical disciplines and prove
effective in the end-to-end engineering of the products. This should
take into account various requirements such as quality, perfor-
mance, cost, safety, security, and reliability. Model-based design
technologies enable the user to perform beforehand different as-
surance related activities such as physical architecture exploration,
system’s behavioral analysis, early verification, and validation.
CHESS [14] is a toolset that provides an integrated framework
that help the modeler(user) automate almost the whole develop-
ment process, from the requirements definition to the modeling
the systemâĂŹs software and hardware architecture, and finally to
its deployment to hardware components [14]. The CHESS follows
a component-based approach. In this case, the user can update
the model’s components continuously throughout all phases of
the development. The CHESS toolset offers schedulability and de-
pendability analysis support across the entire project life cycle.
The results of the analysis are back-propagated to the model it-
self so that the modeler can review and tune the model to satisfy
real-time and dependability requirements [38]. CHESS supports
modeling and analysis across domains and has been applied in
different domains such as Avionics [27], Automotive [10], Space
[35], Telecommunication [30], and Petroleum [26][33].
This paper presents the latest development of CHESS, which
recently became a full-fledged open-source project, hosted by The
Eclipse Foundation (https://www.eclipse.org/chess/). As such, the
code is developed by various contributors following an open-source
approach with public projects for issue tracking, code repository
branches, and continuous integration.
We report on various projects that used CHESS to provide evi-
dence for the assurance of complex systems and on the functionali-
ties that have been added for such purpose. The novel contribution
of the paper is in particular to show how CHESS has been extended
to support safety and security analysis exploiting the CHESS error
model to represent faults and attacks and integrating back tools
such as xSAP [5] and Mobius [18] for the minimal cut sets analysis
and Monte-Carlo simulation.
The rest of the paper is arranged into six sections. Sections 2
provides an introduction to the CHESS tool building blocks and
methodology, Section 3 presents the new major features released
under CHESS 1.0.0, Section 4 presents some practical applications
on different projects, Section 5 discusses the related work with
respect to CHESS approach, in Section 6 we present the envisioned
future extension on CHESS and finally the Section 7 conclude the
paper.
2 CHESS TOOL IN A NUTSHELL
The CHESS modeling tool was released under the Eclipse Po-
larSys project1 and recently it wasmoved from the incubation status
for the first major release. CHESS provides an integrated modeling
methodology and language derived from different existing OMG
languages such as UML/SysML/MARTE under the Papyrus mod-
eling environment. Figure 1 shows the high-level architecture of
CHESS infrastructure. Not all the features from all the three lan-
guages were used, CHESS only exploits a few and specific subsets
to achieve its perspective. There are different tools, plugins, and
languages that were integrated into CHESS to accomplish some
1https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/polarsys.chess
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of the MDE concepts such as model validation, model checking,
realtime and dependability analysis.
Figure 1: CHESS high level structure
In this section, we are going to look at different core aspects
of CHESS methodology, development features, and implementa-
tion mechanisms. We will also look in depth at different analysis
mechanisms that are being performed in CHESS and how they link
together to enhance system correctness.
2.1 Component based methodology
CHESS promotes a component-based development process in
which particular emphasis is given to the ability to specify the
component’s non-functional properties, including some critical
properties such as safety, security, reliability, performance, robust-
ness [31]. This methodology was been adopted to enhance the
separation of concerns between all system hardware and software
components in all the stages of the development process.
The CHESS component-based approach enforces two main as-
pects of modeling referred to as âĂĲCompositionalityâĂİ and âĂĲ-
ComposabilityâĂİ. Compositionality enforces that all the proper-
ties of the whole system are determined as the collection of the
properties of the constituting components and its execution en-
vironment while composability is achieved when the individual
componentsâĂŹ properties are preserved from its definition, de-
velopment, and deployment on the target platform. These two
componentâĂŹs properties are conceived through the whole devel-
opment process to uphold the âĂĲcomposition with guaranteeâĂİ
property which in turn gets verified through the backpropagation
mechanism of the analysis results.
CHESS methodology also follows âĂĲCorrectness by Construc-
tionâĂİ practice which enforces (1) the use of formal and precise
tools and notations for the development and the verification of
all product items (2) the effort to say things only once to avoid
contradictions and repetitions; (3) the effort to design software that
is easy to verify, by e.g., using safer language subsets or appropriate
coding styles and design patterns [36].
The componentâĂŹs extra-functional properties are used when
performing amodel tomodel transformation of a platform-independent
model(PIM) to a platform-specific model(PSM) which in turn uses
predefined and separately compilable code patterns to generates the
component instance representation and later generate associated
code to be deployed on the target platform. The communication
between components is performed through the binding between re-
quired and provided interface of component instances. The CHESS
methodology uses an incremental and iterative process where com-
ponents can be defined in an incremental way using repositories of
components or via composability [11].
2.2 Multi-view modeling approach
The CHESS tool enforces a distinct number of design views
to uphold the separation of concern as defined by the CHESSML
methodology described before. The CHESS model can be modeled
from six distinct main views such as requirement view, component
view, system view, deployment view, analysis view, and instance
view. Throughout the development process, each view has its own
underlined constraints that enforce its specific privileges on model
entities and properties that can be manipulated. Depending on the
current stage of the design process, CHESS subviews are adopted
to enhance certain design properties or stages of the process. The
following figure 2 gives a higher overview of CHESS views archi-
tecture, their relationship, and some main activities that can be
performed in that specific view.
2.2.1 Requirement view. Originally adopted from the SysML re-
quirement diagram, the requirement view is used to define system
requirements and track their verification. In MDE, requirements are
part of the model and play a central role in the system development
life cycle. The system elements are associated with the technical
requirements they satisfy, which are in turn traced to higher-level
requirements, up to system-level requirements [31]. This, in turn,
enhances the traceability while evaluating the correctness and con-
sistency of the modeled system. In this way, the change’s impact
can be better evaluated and faithful model verification evidence
can be provided according to the requirements.
2.2.2 System view. It provides a suitable frame for system-level
design activities. In the System view, the system entities are initially
designed into blocks and then hierarchically decomposed. In this
view, the intel-blocks communication mechanisms can be defined
using different diagrams such as state machine and sequence dia-
grams. The system view is used to work with contract-based design
and several functional and dependability analysis are supported at
this level. The same as SysML, the CHESSML inherits the speci-
fication of the block internal block diagram, for instance, a block
diagram can contain different blocks and each block has its own
dedicated internal block diagram.
2.2.3 Component view. This view is one of the heavily used in
CHESS as it can accommodate most of the technical design work
and logic of the intended model. The component view is composed
of two sub-views, Functional View which is enabled by default,
and the Extra-Functional View which is enabled manually in
the tool. The functional view is used to model system functional
specifications using diagrams such as class, composite structure,
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Figure 2: CHESS views architecture
state machine, activity, and sequence diagrams. On the other hand,
the extra-functional view is used to compose the systemâĂŹs extra-
functional specifications such as the real-time and dependability
attributes. Recall that all views have a dedicated palette depending
on their requirements, for instance, the extra-functional view has
no access to the activity diagram and has the palette with only
entries related to extra-functional concerns.
2.2.4 Deployment view. : This view is used to model the hardware
structure of the system and permits the allocation of their corre-
sponding software component instances. Through the use of class
and composite structure diagrams, the user can model the type of
deployment either single or multi-core processor. In this view, each
hardware resource is allocated to a specific memory partition and
can only access and change its own memory space. Regarding the
software to hardware resources allocation, all software components
are allocated to cores.
2.2.5 Analysis view. : This is used to capture all the activities and di-
agrams related to analysis in CHESS. It consists of the two subviews
such as Dependability Analysis view and Real-Time Analysis
view. The analyses performed in CHESS are dependability analysis,
real-time analysis, state-based analysis, Failure Propagation analy-
sis, timing analysis, and so on. We will discuss further on analysis
in section 2.3.
2.2.6 Instance view. CHESS provides a dedicated view to visualize
and model the Platform Specific Model(PSM) model as a combi-
nation of hardware and software instances generated from the
deployment and component views respectively through the com-
posite structure diagrams. This is a novel approach to facilitate the
analysis between model instances. These instances are automati-
cally generated when the BuildInstance command is invoked. In
the generated instance model each componentâĂŹs property and
connector are mapped onto a dedicated InstanceSpecification, while
ports are mapped onto slots.
2.3 Model-based Analysis and verification
CHESS provides the capability to perform various kinds of anal-
ysis depending on the specific kind of requirements (functional,
timing, dependability). Many of these functionalities have been
added to the new release of CHESS and are expanded further in the
next section.
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Functional Verification by means of model checking is sup-
ported by the integrated nuXmv model checker [13]. System and
component properties can be formalized into linear temporal logic
properties, then they can be verified on top of the system’s or
component’s behavior models developed using state machines.
Contract-Based Analysis is built on top of the OCRA tool sup-
port [15]. Component formal properties are structured in terms
of contracts, comprised of an assumption and a guarantee of the
interface. The assumption is a restriction on the componentâĂŹs
environment or usage, and the guarantee is a property that must
be satisfied by the component - provided that the environment
satisfies the assumption [32].
Timing Analysis: Built on top of the MAST2 analysis tool, tim-
ing analysis is invoked to perform analysis such as schedulability
analysis, end-to-end response time analysis. Schedulability analysis
is performed by taking input from the model and the computed par-
tition schedule on each available processing unit and then perform
the response-time analysis that calculates the worst-case response
time of each task[27]. The end-to-end analysis is done by utilizing
the component sequence diagram. Applying MARTE timing stereo-
types, the tool evaluates the hardware component’s responsiveness.
This analysis facilitates âĂĲearly end-to-end response time veri-
fication", this can give a sense of any possible refinement of the
model before deployment [31].
Model validation: The tool is equipped with various types of
model validations to better validate the software system following
its target platform. Here we can mention: (1) Model core constraints
validation is performed to enforce the CHESS model constraints
including specific preconditions as required by the schedulability
analysis. (2) Validate model for state-based analysis, (3) Validate
model for model checking (4) Validate model for criticality specifica-
tion and finally (5) Validate model for Automotive 26262 compliance
(only specific for automotive domain). The last validation checks the
system correctness of Automotive Safety Integrity Level(ASIL) in-
heritance and decomposition according to the ISO 26262 standard.
3 NEW SYSTEM-LEVEL ANALYSIS SUPPORT
In this section, we are presenting the newmajor features released
in CHESS 1.0.0. The new releases include the extension support for
system-level safety and security analysis. CHESSML dependability
profile which normally supports different techniques for safety
and dependability analysis has been extended to model fault injec-
tion and threats. Other new features include contract validations,
parameter-based architectures, and document generation. This new
release can be accessed at https://www.eclipse.org/chess/download.
html
3.1 Fault Injection and Model-Based Safety
Analysis with xSAP
The new release supports the conduct of Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) and Fault Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA). FTA is a deductive
technique for identifying, evaluating, and modeling the interrela-
tionship between events leading to a failure or an undesired state
whereas FMEA is a a highly structured approach through which
2https://mast.unican.es/
Figure 3: State machine modeling faulty behavior
all potential failure modes of a system and their effects can be
identified, evaluated, and prioritized [40].
Once the system model is defined in CHESS, through compo-
nents definition and their nominal models, the faulty behavior is
expressed in CHESS through a specific state machine called "Error
Model". The Error Model extends the nominal state machine with
information about the effect upon a property of the component,
and consequently on its nominal behavior. The next figure repre-
sents an example of an error model that, in case of an internal fault,
moves the related component in an error state where the property
energy is stuck at 0 value. The optional probability assigned to that
transition is 5 x 10-2. Once the error model is defined, the FTA or
FMEA can be done by invoking the xSAP symbolic model checker
through the CHESS environment.
The xSAP approach is based on the idea of library-based fault in-
jection (i.e., an extension of a behavioral model with the definition
of faults taken from a library of faults) and the use of model-based
routines to generate safety artifacts. Those analyses are conducted
on components responsiveness in case of faults, errors, or failures.
FTA and FMEA are still the main instruments to analyze the propa-
gation of threats and produce evidence that the system fulfills its
safety requirements [34].
The result of the FTA is the fault tree that is automatically shown
in a dedicated panel in the front-end; see Figure 3 for an example
of a resulting fault tree. If fault probabilities have been specified
during the configuration of the error model, the fault tree will report
their combination. The fault tree can be examined, in particular, the
minimal cut-set and so the basic fault conditions which can lead
to the top-level failure. This is additional to the already existing
analysis techniques in CHESS such as Failure logic analysis (CHESS-
FLA) and State-based analysis(CHESS-SBA).
3.2 Threat Models and Security Analysis with
Mobius
The new release supports the modeling of security concerns
which help in threat identification at the early stages of the de-
velopment and initiate the automated maximum recovery process.
CHESS implemented a methodology on modeling a system security
threat, for instance, a cyber-security attack on a system can be
referred to as unauthorized access of the system, halting services of
the system, a data corruption threat which may result in corrupting
the services of the component.
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Figure 4: A fault tree visualized in the CHESS Editor View;
note the probabilities associated to the top and basic events
Figure 5: Process of Security breach
Figure 5 depict the process of a security breach that leads to the
violation of the security-related properties. A threat event, initiated
by a threat source agent, able to exploit a vulnerability of an asset
(e.g. a component/system) may result in a loss to the confidentiality,
integrity, and/or availability of the asset.
Figure 6: Erroneous state transition due to security threat
event and vulnerability
To model the security breach, using an «ErrorModel»-tagged
state machine, the failure, internal fault and effect are extended
to include security threats, vulnerability and consequences respec-
tively. Figure 6 illustrates the error model, where a cyber-security
attack initiates a data corruption threat and exploiting the value
check function is false vulnerability thus causing a transition to erro-
neous state. Note that a component could have multiple instances of
«ErrorModel»tagged state machines, attached to it. Each instance
would provide the elaboration of input/output failure behavior
addressing a specific concern.
MÃűbius3 is a software tool for modeling the behavior of com-
plex systems, by allowing the study of the reliability, availability, se-
curity, and performance for large-scale discrete-event systems [18].
Many reliability analysis results can be obtained with probabilistic
models built with Mobius using the stochastic activity networks
(SAN) formalism, solved then via Monte-Carlo simulation4. The
CHESS-Mobius integration plugin is conceived to support the mod-
eling of fault-tolerant software under cyber-attacks and facilitate
the exploiting of the Mobius capabilities for analysis of reliability.
The generation of the Mobius SAN model process is done by per-
forming an automatic model-to-model transformation from amodel
instance to the SAN model recognized by Mobius for reliability
analysis with Mobius. The transformation engine was implemented
using eclipse based tools such as qvto and Acceleo. The traceabil-
ity information about the CHESS entities and the generated Ecore
SAN model are saved in the SAN folder as .qvtoTrace file. The
file comes with a dedicated editor to be used when checking the
mappings.
3.3 Improved support for contract-based
design analysis and model checking
In the contract-based paradigm, the properties of each compo-
nent may be restricted to its interface, and the contracts are pairs
of properties representing an assumption and a guarantee of the
component. The CHESS tool supports the contract refinement anal-
ysis for all composite components. The contract of the composite
component is ensured by the contracts of the sub-components âĂŞ
considering their interconnection as described by the architecture -
and that the assumption of each sub-component is ensured by the
contracts of the other sibling sub-components and the assumption
of the composite component.
The new release has improved the model analysis aspects by
integrating CHESS with V&V tools such as OCRA, nuXmv, and
xSAP. In this regard, the new additional analysis includes:
(1) Model checking, i.e. the behavioral models, that describe how
the internal state of a component and the output ports are updated,
can be verified against some formal properties in different temporal
logics. The formal properties can represent some requirements
(e.g., functional or safety-related requirements) or some validation
queries such as the reachability of states.
(2) Contract-based compositional verification of state machines, i.e.
state machines are verified separately against the local contracts of
the corresponding components and the correctness of the system
is implicitly derived by the correctness of the contract refinement
and the local state machines.
3https://www.mobius.illinois.edu/
4https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/montecarlosimulation.asp
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(3) Contract-based safety analysis, i.e. identify the component
failures as the failure of its implementation in satisfying the con-
tract. When the component is composite, its failure can be caused
by the failure of one or more sub-components and/or the failure
of the environment in satisfying the assumption. As result, this
analysis produces a fault tree in which each intermediate event
represents the failure of a component or its environment and is
linked to a Boolean combination of other nodes; the top-level event
is the failure of the system component, while the basic events are
the failures of the leaf components and the failure of the system
environment (see [8] for more details).
3.4 Support for parameterized architecture and
trade-off analysis
In a parameterized architecture the number of components, the
number of ports, the connections, and the static attributes of compo-
nents depends on a (possibly infinite) set of parameters. In the new
release, it is possible to define a parameterized architecture, setting
the multiplicity of FlowPorts and sub-components to express a list
of elements with the same type. This can be very helpful when mod-
eling a system with a large number of similar nodes. The modeling
of the parameterized architecture is followed by its instantiation.
In this phase the user sets the values of the parameters, i.e. he/she
defines the configuration of the architecture. OCRA takes in input
the parameterized architecture and one or more configurations.
Then, OCRA produces the instances of the architecture, and for
each of them, it performs a list of contract-based verifications. The
output is the result derived from the contract-based verifications
described in Section3.3.
This new release also supports Tradeoff analysis which allows
to execute a certain check such as safety, security, performance
selected configurations (instances) and get the results in a view
that simplifies the comparison between them. This makes it easy to
visually get an idea of how the intended model instances perform
with respect to the selected configurations.
Figure 7: Trade-off Analysis results sample
Figure 7 shows the sample result of a trade-off analysis made
on two instances by looking at different concerns specified on the
assumption/guarantee formal properties of each contract.
3.5 Automatic generation of diagrams and
documentation
The traditional way of editing a model is by adding an element in
a diagram but changes made in the model are not reflected in the di-
agrams. The new CHESS release offers the possibility of generating
a diagram from the model which reflects the data in the model on
the fly. The supported diagrams are Block Definition Diagram(BDD)
and Internal Block diagram(IBD). Multiple diagrams can be gener-
ated on a single component in the model. The generated diagram
Figure 8: Generated report sample
elements will be automatically aligned but the user can rearrange by
moving elements manually or by invoking âĂĲlayout selection
command.âĂİ
The new release also supports the generation of the model archi-
tecture and the report on various analyses executed on the model
in an HTML document or a LaTeX source code. The report is di-
vided into two sections. The first describes the structure of the
model which includes diagrams and the associated components
while the second includes the report lists of the results of the val-
idation and verification analyses results(V&V) run on the model.
There are many types of V&V results such as property validation,
assume/guarantee properties results, contract checks results, model
checking, FTA, FMEA, and so on. Figure 8 gives the sample of the
report page that can be generated by the tool.
4 CHESS TOOL IN PRACTICE
Throughout different phases of extending CHESS, CHESS was
involved in many projects, research communities, and academies.
CHESS has been used for teaching and extending it for research
purposes. CHESS has conducted more than 10 international recog-
nized research and development projects in the frame of 8 years5.
Following we list a brief extent on the projects through which the
CHESS tool played a major role.
5https://projects.eclipse.org/projects/polarsys.chess/releases/1.0.0/review
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Figure 9: CHESS fit in AMASS project
4.1 ARTEMIS JU-CHESS
ARTEMIS JU-CHESS6 is the originating project that developed
the CHESS tool. The project aimed to improve model-driven engi-
neering practices and technologies to better address safety, reliabil-
ity, performance, robustness, and other non-functional concerns.
This is achieved while guaranteeing the correctness and composi-
tion of components under development in the embedded systems
domain [37]. From this point, the various project was initiated to
extend CHESS to a new level by adding more functionalities and
incorporate other domains.
4.2 CONCERTO
CONCERTO7 project aimed to deliver a reference multi-domain
architectural framework for complex, highly concurrent, and multi-
core systems, where non-functional properties (including real-time,
dependability, and energy management) was established for indi-
vidual components. CONCERTO framework was built on top of the
CHESS framework developed in 4.1, as well as the results of several
other related projects. The project enforced the modeling of multi-
core processors among the possible target platforms, with the same
level of correctness and guarantees as for traditional single-core
processor targets [4].
4.3 AMASS
AMASS8 (Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and Seamless As-
surance and Certification of Cyber-Physical Systems) project aim
was to create and consolidate the de-facto European-wide open tool
platform, ecosystem, and self-sustainable community for assurance
and certification of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in the largest in-
dustrial vertical markets [2]. In this project, CHESS played a role in
system architecture modeling assurance, patterns library manage-
ment assurances, contract-based assurances, and verification and
validation (V&V) based assurances through its extension with some
tools such as OCRA, nuXmv, and xSAP. AMASS is an open-sourced
6http://www.chess-project.org/
7http://www.concerto-project.org/
8https://www.amass-ecsel.eu/
Figure 10: The main workflow supported by CHESS in
AMASS
project, Figure 9 shows the CHESS fitting position in the AMASS
project. For future consultation, the contributor offers free training
accessible at https://www.amass-ecsel.eu/content/training which
includes video tutorials and documentation. Figure 10 shows the
main workflow supported by CHESS in the context of AMASS. The
workflow included the definition of the system and their formal re-
quirements, the functional refinement of the system, the definition
of the nominal and faulty behaviors, and finally, the safety analysis.
4.4 AQUAS
AQUAS9(Aggregated Quality Assurance in Systems) project aims
was to improve on how the non-functional requirements of safety,
security, performance (SSP) are dealt with during the product life
cycle for embedded computer systems. AQUAS approach was based
on two main principles. First, apply the methods for combined
analyses of project artifacts from the viewpoints of safety, security,
performance. Second, limit the overhead cost of these combined
analyses by only applying them at a limited number of points in
the product lifecycle, called interaction points [25].
The main CHESS’s contribution to the project was to support
the modeling of the software architecture of the several use cases.
The CHESS dependability profile embedded in the CHESS was
used to enrich the system and software architecture model with
information about the error model of the system and software
components. Finally, the tool was used to perform dependability
analyses such as the failure propagation analysis [24].
4.5 SESAMO
SESAMO10 project aimed to develop a methodology to reduce
interdependencies between safety and security mechanisms. This
was achieved by constructing a tool-chain that uses the constructive
elements and integrated analysis procedures to ensure the safety
and security characteristics of the system are maintained [39]. The
9https://aquas-project.eu/
10http://sesamo-project.eu/
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Figure 11: CHESS fit in MegaM@Rt Tekne case study
CHESS contribution to the project was (1) to enforce the separation
of concerns from its robust multiview modeling approach enacted
directly in the user modeling space. (2) Provide a cross-domain
component model and a coherent component-based development
methodology. (3) Reinforce correctness-by-construction in a declar-
ative approach when specifying, verifying, and implementing the
non-functional concerns. (4) Provide a strict separation between
PIM and PSM derived by formally verified transformation as a
correct-by-construction product [41].
4.6 MEGAMART
MegaM@Rt11 is an open-sourced project with the ambition to
create a framework which incorporate methods and tools for con-
tinuous development and validation. This project leverages the
advantages in scalable model-based methods to provide benefits in
significantly improved productivity, quality, and predictability of
large and complex industrial systems. Employing its rich model-
driven toolchain, CHESS served in the design and the develop-
ment of high-integrity systems with a focus on non-functional
properties[1]. In this project, CHESS was used in the design and
analysis of the Tekne case study. This was an ultra-wideband (UWB)
mobile network technology with a short-range communication, in-
door positioning, and tracking capabilities [19].
Figure 11 the process of modeling the Tekne case study as pro-
vided by the project. In this project, requirementmodeling, traceabil-
ity, contract-based design approach, component real-time behavior
analysis was modeled using CHESS. Finally, the runtime system
logs were collected and analyzed for non-functional aspects and
the results are backpropagation to the design environment [19].
11https://megamart2-ecsel.eu/
5 RELATEDWORK
Several commercial tools provide similar functionalities of CHESS.
One of the most popular isMatlab/Simulink[29]. Although Mat-
lab/Simulink facilitates the modelling and analysis of complex sys-
tems its simulation efficiency might be an important disadvantage.
Being based on a single Model of Computation and Communication
(MoCC) is another limitation. CoFluent is other commercial tool
extended to model IoT systems [28]. Although supporting more
interaction models that Matlab/Simulink, it is also limited in the
way components may interact among them. Another tendency is
to overcome the UML lacks in semantic content required in some
application domains, towards a proliferation of DSLs [9]. Among
the available DSLs, UML/MARTE is the standard language for real-
time and embedded systems design, while SysML is the standard
language for systemmodeling. Several modelling environments like
Papyrus [20] support UML/MARTE. Nevertheless, its flexibility
and semantic richness requires the definition of efficient modelling
methodologies.
Capella [21] open-source comprehensive and extensible Eclipse
system modelling tool, inspired to the SysML principles and sup-
porting the ARCADIA methodology that is successfully deployed
in a wide variety of industrial contexts [6]. ARCADIA provides ar-
chitectural descriptions for functional analysis, structural analysis,
interfaces and behavior modeling, structured in five perspectives
according to major system engineering activities and concerns.
COMPASS [7] supports model checking, model-based safety,
reliability, and performance analysis and shares with CHESS some
of the tools used as backend for such analyses. Differently from
CHESS, it targets a variant of AADL and does not support trace-
ability and code generation.
MapleSim12 is a modeling tool for multi-domain engineering
systems built on top ofModelicamodeling language [22].MapleSim
features an integrated environment in which the system equations
can be automatically generated and analyzed [12].
Although we see some approaches able to tackle modeling chal-
lenges, no tool or approach has been able to fit in our methodology
with such analysis and verification functionalities. Which makes
CHESS a novel approach for implementing component-based mod-
eling methodology for real-time and dependable systems by taking
care of non-functional properties and enforces the correctness at
all the stages of the development process.
6 FUTUREWORK
CHESS is a very huge toolset with more sophisticated and power-
ful functionality to meet user needs. However, there is still a gap for
improvement, to cover more and more domains such as the Internet
of Things (IoT) in a more concrete way. This is going to be done
under Lowcomote project13, an EU funded project on advancing
the state of the art on lowcode development platforms to Lowcode
Engineering. Note that we are not concluding that it is incapable
of performing some basic modeling of IoT related scenarios but
we aspire to make it more IoT specific. This extension will follow
CHESSâĂŹs component-based methodology and it will also follow
already existing modeling approaches present in CHESS.
12https://www.maplesoft.com/products/maplesim/
13https://www.lowcomote.eu/
Model-based analysis support for dependable complex systems in CHESS MODELS ’20 Companion, October 18–23, 2020, Virtual Event, Canada
The envisioned approach will be achieved by implementing new
components of stereotypes, contracts, communications, and opera-
tions stereotypes specifically for IoT. The new proposed approach
will also take in use of already existing dependability analysis infras-
tructure such as Fault Mode Effect Analysis, Fault Logic Analysis,
Fault Tree Analysis, and so on. We plan also to embed an exporta-
tion environment where IoT models developed in CHESS can be
exported to the external consumers. Finally, we plan to learn from
the current CHESS’s code generation support for Ada language and
integrate the open-source ThingML framework for code generation
for IoT.
7 CONCLUSION
Dependable complex system design and development present
several challenges, the known used canonical approach is to divide
complex systems into smaller chunks (or subsystems), build them
separately, and later integrate them. In this paper, we presented
the current state of the CHESS tool to tackle design, analysis, and
verification of real-time dependable complex systems. We walked
through the CHESS tool main architecture and we highlighted its
component-based and multi-view modeling approaches. We have
also presented the newly system-level extensions and capabilities
of the tool released under the CHESS1.0.0 version. Finally, we intro-
duced the different projects and contributions where CHESS was
used either in the industry and academia at large and presented the
future envisioned extension strategy.
8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This work has received funding from the Lowcomote project
under European UnionâĂŹs Horizon 2020 research and innovation
program under the Marie SkÅĆodowska-Curie grant agreement
n°813884. We would like to acknowledge also different projects
funding leading to the mature realization of CHESS which include
the CHESS [17], CONCERTO [16], SESAMO [39] under ARTEMIS
Joint Undertaking initiative, and AMASS [3], and AQUAS [23] under
ECSEL Joint Undertaking initiative. We would like to acknowledge
the main contributors to the development of the CHESS toolset,
in particular Stefano Puri, Nicholas Pacini, Luca Cristoforetti and
Pietro Braghieri. Finally, we would like to acknowledge also Prof.
Davide Di Ruscio for the assistance on drafting this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] Wasif Afzal, Hugo Bruneliere, Davide Di Ruscio, Andrey Sadovykh, SilviaMazzini,
Eric Cariou, Dragos Truscan, Jordi Cabot, Abel Gómez, Jesús Gorroñogoitia, Luigi
Pomante, and Pavel Smrz. 2018. TheMegaM@Rt2 ECSEL project: MegaModelling
at Runtime – Scalable model-based framework for continuous development
and runtime validation of complex systems. Microprocessors and Microsystems:
Embedded Hardware Design (MICPRO) 61 (Sept. 2018), 86 – 95. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.micpro.2018.05.010
[2] Elena Alaña and Javier Herrero. 2018. Design and safety assessment of on-board
software applications using the amass platform. In EUROSPACE DASIA 2018.
[3] Assurance and certification of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). 2019. [Online].
https://www.amass-ecsel.eu/ Last Accessed: July 2020.
[4] Laura Baracchi, Silvia Mazzini, Stefano Puri, and Tullio Vardanega. 2016. Lessons
Learned in a Journey Toward Correct-by-Construction Model-Based Develop-
ment. In Reliable Software Technologies – Ada-Europe 2016, Marko Bertogna,
Luis Miguel Pinho, and Eduardo Quiñones (Eds.). Springer International Publish-
ing, Cham, 113–128.
[5] Benjamin Bittner, Marco Bozzano, Roberto Cavada, Alessandro Cimatti, Marco
Gario, Alberto Griggio, Cristian Mattarei, Andrea Micheli, and Gianni Zampedri.
2016. The xSAP Safety Analysis Platform. In Tools and Algorithms for the Con-
struction and Analysis of Systems - 22nd International Conference, TACAS 2016,
Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice of Software,
ETAPS 2016, Eindhoven, The Netherlands, April 2-8, 2016, Proceedings (Lecture
Notes in Computer Science), Marsha Chechik and Jean-François Raskin (Eds.),
Vol. 9636. Springer, 533–539. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49674-9_31
[6] StÃľphane Bonnet, Jean-Luc Voirin, VÃľronique Normand, and Daniel Exertier.
2015. Implementing the MBSE Cultural Change: Organization, Coaching and
Lessons Learned. INCOSE International Symposium 25, 1 (2015), 508–523. https:
//doi.org/10.1002/j.2334-5837.2015.00078.x
[7] Marco Bozzano, Harold Bruintjes, Alessandro Cimatti, Joost-Pieter Katoen,
Thomas Noll, and Stefano Tonetta. 2019. COMPASS 3.0. In Tools and Algo-
rithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems - 25th International Conference,
TACAS 2019, Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on Theory and Practice
of Software, ETAPS 2019, Prague, Czech Republic, April 6-11, 2019, Proceedings,
Part I (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), Tomás Vojnar and Lijun Zhang (Eds.),
Vol. 11427. Springer, 379–385. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17462-0_25
[8] Marco Bozzano, Alessandro Cimatti, Cristian Mattarei, and Stefano Tonetta. 2014.
Formal safety assessment via contract-based design. In International Symposium
on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis. Springer, 81–97.
[9] Marco Brambilla, Jordi Cabot, and Manuel Wimmer. 2012. Model-
Driven Software Engineering in Practice. Vol. 1. https://doi.org/10.2200/
S00441ED1V01Y201208SWE001
[10] L. Bressan, A. L. de Oliveira, L. Montecchi, and B. Gallina. 2018. A Systematic
Process for Applying the CHESS Methodology in the Creation of Certifiable
Evidence. In 2018 14th European Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC). 49–
56.
[11] L. Bressan, A. L. de Oliveira, L. Montecchi, and B. Gallina. 2018. A Systematic
Process for Applying the CHESS Methodology in the Creation of Certifiable
Evidence. In 2018 14th European Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC). 49–
56.
[12] Jia Ming Cao and Tao Wu. 2013. Multi-Domain Modeling Simulation and Ap-
plication Based on MapleSim. In Mechatronics and Intelligent Materials III (Ad-
vanced Materials Research), Vol. 706. Trans Tech Publications Ltd, 1894–1897.
https://doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.706-708.1894
[13] Roberto Cavada, Alessandro Cimatti, Michele Dorigatti, Alberto Griggio, Alessan-
dro Mariotti, Andrea Micheli, Sergio Mover, Marco Roveri, and Stefano Tonetta.
2014. The nuXmv Symbolic Model Checker. In Computer Aided Verification -
26th International Conference, CAV 2014, Held as Part of the Vienna Summer of
Logic, VSL 2014, Vienna, Austria, July 18-22, 2014. Proceedings (Lecture Notes in
Computer Science), Armin Biere and Roderick Bloem (Eds.), Vol. 8559. Springer,
334–342. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08867-9_22
[14] A. Cicchetti, F. Ciccozzi, S. Mazzini, S. Puri, M. Panunzio, A. Zovi, and T. Var-
danega. 2012. CHESS: a model-driven engineering tool environment for aiding
the development of complex industrial systems. In 2012 Proceedings of the 27th
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering. 362–365.
[15] Alessandro Cimatti, Michele Dorigatti, and Stefano Tonetta. 2013. OCRA: A
tool for checking the refinement of temporal contracts. In 2013 28th IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE 2013, Silicon
Valley, CA, USA, November 11-15, 2013, Ewen Denney, Tevfik Bultan, and Andreas
Zeller (Eds.). IEEE, 702–705. https://doi.org/10.1109/ASE.2013.6693137
[16] Guaranteed component assembly with round trip analysis for energy efficient
High integrity Multi-core systems. 2020. [Online]. http://www.concerto-project.
org/ Last Accessed: July 2020.
[17] CHESS consortium. 2012. CHESS project website. http://www.chess-project.org/
Last Accessed: July 2020.
[18] T. Courtney, S. Gaonkar, K. Keefe, E. W. D. Rozier, and W. H. Sanders. 2009.
MÃűbius 2.3: An extensible tool for dependability, security, and performance
evaluation of large and complex system models. In 2009 IEEE/IFIP International
Conference on Dependable Systems Networks. 353–358.
[19] Jesus Gorroñogoitia Cruz, Andrey Sadovykh, Dragos Truscan, Hugo Bruneliere,
Pierluigi Pierini, and Lara Lopez Muñiz. 2020. MegaM@Rt2 EU Project: Open
Source Tools for Mega-Modelling at Runtime of CPSs. In Open Source Systems,
Vladimir Ivanov, Artem Kruglov, Sergey Masyagin, Alberto Sillitti, and Giancarlo
Succi (Eds.). Springer International Publishing, Cham, 183–189.
[20] Eclipse. 2020. Eclipse Papyrus Modeling environment. https://www.eclipse.org/
papyrus/ Last Accessed: July 2020.
[21] Eclipse. 2020. An open source solution for model-based systems engineering. https:
//www.eclipse.org/capella/ Last Accessed: July 2020.
[22] Hilding Elmqvist, Sven Erik Mattsson, and Martin Otter. June, 1998. MODELICA-
The new object oriented modeling language. The 12th European Simulation
Multiconference (June, 1998). https://www.modelica.org/publications/papers/
esm98mod.pdf
[23] Aggregated Quality Assurance for Systems. 2020. [Online]. https://aquas-
project.eu/ Last Accessed: July 2020.
[24] Christian Fuss, Mario Winkler, and et al. 2018. Deliverable 4.1: Report on Co-
Engineering Process Support. Technical Report. ANSYS medini Technologies AG
MODELS ’20 Companion, October 18–23, 2020, Virtual Event, Canada Felicien et al
and AQUAS partners. http://aquas-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/D4.
1.pdf
[25] Marwa Gadala, Lorenzo Strigini, and et al. 2019. Deliverable 3.2: Com-
bined Safety, Security and Performance Analysis and Assessment Tech-
niques - Preliminary. Technical Report. City, University of London and
AQUAS team. http://aquas-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/D3.2_
CombinedAnalysiPreliminary_v2_0bis.pdf
[26] B. Gallina, E. Sefer, and A. Refsdal. 2014. Towards Safety Risk Assessment of
Socio-Technical Systems via Failure Logic Analysis. In 2014 IEEE International
Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops. 287–292.
[27] W. Godard and Geoffrey Nelissen. 2016. Model-based design and schedulability
analysis for avionic applications on multicore platforms. 37 (09 2016), 157–163.
[28] Intel. 2020. Solution for simulation and modeling of systems. https://www.intel.
com/content/www/us/en/cofluent/overview.html Last Accessed: July 2020.
[29] Mathwork. 2020. Simulation and ModelâĂŚBased Design. https://www.
mathworks.com/products/simulink.html Last Accessed: July 2020.
[30] Silvia Mazzini. 2015. The CONCERTO project: An open source methodology
for designing, deploying, and operating reliable and safe CPS systems. Ada User
Journal 36 (Dec. 2015), 264–267.
[31] S. Mazzini, J. Favaro, and L. Baracchi. 2015. A Model-Based Approach Across the
IoT Lifecycle for Scalable and Distributed Smart Applications. In 2015 IEEE 18th
International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems. 149–154.
[32] Silvia Mazzini, JohnM. Favaro, Stefano Puri, and Laura Baracchi. 2016. CHESS: an
Open Source Methodology and Toolset for the Development of Critical Systems.
In EduSymp/OSS4MDE@MoDELS.
[33] Leonardo Montecchi and Barbara Gallina. 2017. SafeConcert: A Metamodel
for a Concerted Safety Modeling of Socio-Technical Systems. In Model-Based
Safety and Assessment, Marco Bozzano and Yiannis Papadopoulos (Eds.). Springer
International Publishing, Cham, 129–144.
[34] Leonardo Montecchi and Barbara Gallina. 2017. SafeConcert: A Metamodel
for a Concerted Safety Modeling of Socio-Technical Systems. In Model-Based
Safety and Assessment, Marco Bozzano and Yiannis Papadopoulos (Eds.). Springer
International Publishing, Cham, 129–144.
[35] Lorenzo Pace, Mauro Pasquinelli, Diego Gerbaz, Joachim Fuchs, Valter Basso,
S. Mazzini, Laura Baracchi, Stefano Puri, Marco Lassalle, and Juhani Viitaniemi.
2014. Model-based approach for the verification enhancement across the lifecycle
of a space system. In INCOSE Italian Chapter Conference on Systems Engineering
(CIISE2014).
[36] Marco Panunzio and Tullio Vardanega. 2014. A component-based process with
separation of concerns for the development of embedded real-time software
systems. Journal of Systems and Software 96 (2014), 105 – 121. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.jss.2014.05.076
[37] CHESS project: âĂĲComposition with guarantees for high-integrity embedded
software components assemblyâĂİ. 2012. [Online]. http://www.chess-project.
org/ Last Accessed: July 2020.
[38] Stefano Puri, Silvia Mazzini, and Nichoras Pachini. May 2020. CHESS Toolset
User Guide, Toolset Release 1.0.0.
[39] Security and Safety Modelling. 2015. [Online]. http://sesamo-project.eu/ Last
Accessed: July 2020.
[40] Mahmood Shafiee, Evenye Enjema, and Athanasios Kolios. 2019. An Integrated
FTA-FMEA Model for Risk Analysis of Engineering Systems: A Case Study
of Subsea Blowout Preventers. Applied Sciences 9, 6 (Mar 2019), 1192. https:
//doi.org/10.3390/app9061192
[41] SESAMO Team. 2014. D4.2 âĂŞ Integrated Design and Evaluation Methodology
Version 01. http://sesamo-project.eu/documents
